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THE GAME OF PURE STRATEGY IS SOLVED!
GLENN C. RHOADS AND LAURENT BARTHOLDI
Abstract. We solve the classical “Game of Pure Strategy” using linear pro-
gramming. We notice an intricate even-odd behavior in the results of our
computations, that seems to encourage odd or maximal bids.
1. Introduction
Simple, two-player games are important models for human decision making; they
should have sufficiently elementary rules that they can be studied both theoretically
and empirically, yet be sufficiently rich to involve a non-trivial amount of human
psychological experience.
We study, and solve numerically, the “Game of Pure Strategy”, a model of
decision making based on bidding. It is an important paradigm in game theory,
because it can easily be shown (see below) that no deterministic strategy may
succeed.
We notice, in the numerical data, that the parity of the bid is often more impor-
tant than its actual value. This echoes a known recommendation for online bidding
(in which the bidding amounts are less restricted than in room bidding): the web-
site www.bidnapper.com recommends to its customers to “Bid in odd amounts.
Many novices bid in rounded numbers.”
The computations were made with the help of the RRZN in Hannover, whose
support is gratefully acknowledged.
2. The Game of Pure Strategy
Goofspiel, also called Game of Pure Strategy (GOPS) is a two person game.
Take a standard 52 card deck and discard all of the cards of one suit. The cards
of one suit are given to one player, the cards of another suit are given to the other
player, and the cards in the remaining suit are shuffled and placed face down in the
middle. The cards are valued from low to high as ace=1, 2, 3, . . . , 10, jack=11,
queen=12, and king=13.
A round consists of turning up the next card from the middle pile and then the
two players ‘bet’ on the upturned card, each player choosing one card and then
simultaneously displaying it to the other player. The player showing the highest
card wins the value of the upturned card. If both players display the same card, the
point value is split between the two players. These three cards are then discarded.
The game ends after 13 rounds and the winner is the person who obtained the most
points (you need 46 or better to win).
Though the mechanics of the game are simple, the strategy is not. Suppose for
example that the king is the upturned card in the first round. Further suppose that
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you choose to bet one (i.e. the ace). When you turn your card up, you found out
that your opponent bet his king winning 13 points. You are happy with this result
because you now have 12 more betting points which should more than make up for
the lost 13 points. In fact, it is possible that you could win every remaining point by
always betting one more than your opponent (though of course that would require
cheating, by knowing in advance what your opponent is going to bet). However,
you are taking a chance by betting only one: if your opponent had bet a two or
three, then she would have won 13 points at almost no cost. When playing the game
you are trying to outguess your opponent while your opponent is trying to outguess
you: you find yourself reasoning along lines such as “my opponent is probably going
to play X so I should play Y , but he may see through this and instead play Z to
defeat Y so maybe I should play W instead.”
3. Solving GOPS
To make use of game theory, we use an equivalent scoring system: the player
with the higher card wins from the opponent the value of the upturned card, or
wins nothing in the event of a tie. The game is now a two-person zero-sum game
that can be represented by a matrix with one row for each possible play of player
one and one column for each possible play of player two. The i, j’th entry of the
matrix is the value of the game to player one when player one makes his i’th play
while player two makes her j’th play (such a formulation is called a matrix game).
It is not hard to see that you should not choose a deterministic strategy. In
fact, every deterministic strategy A can be defeated as follows. Use strategy A
to find the card that my opponent is going to play. If my opponent is going to
play a King, play the ace. Otherwise play the card that is one higher than my
opponent’s choice. This counterstrategy will win every round except one resulting
in a trouncing. Instead your strategy should have some random variations where
you play particular cards with some probability.
How difficult is it to analyze this game? Suppose the cards are valued from 1
through N . The number of distinct ways that the middle suit could be ordered
and the number of distinct betting sequences for each player is N factorial. Hence,
the number of possible ways of playing out a game is f(N) = (N !)3. Analysis of
GOPS, along these lines, would require consideration, for N = 13, of 2.4 × 1029
variations, a number clearly beyond computational possibilities.
To our knowledge, the game had never been previously analyzed beyond N = 5,
see [Kerr (online)]. There is a way to signficantly reduce the number of games
needed to be analyzed. Sheldon Ross [Ross (1971)] describes a recursive rule ex-
pressing the value of a game as a function of the values of smaller games. We give
a further simplification of his rule.
Let f(V, Y, P ) be the value for player one of the game in which V is the set of
cards player one has in his hand, Y is the set of cards player two has in her hand,
and P is the set of cards in the deck. Further, for Pk ∈ P , let fk(V, Y, P ) be the
value for player one of that game, once the upcard Pk has been revealed. Clearly
f(V, Y, P ) is the average of the fk(V, Y, P ):
f(V, Y, P ) =
1
|P |
∑
Pk∈P
fk(V, Y, P ).
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Suppose |V | = |Y | = |P | = N . Then fk(V, Y, P ) is expressed as the value of the
N ×N game whose payoff matrix [Xij ] is
Xij = Pk sign(Vi − Yj) + f(V \ {Vi}, Y \ {Yj}, P \ {Pk});
here
sign(x) =


1 if x > 0,
0 if x = 0,
−1 if x < 0.
In english, this self-evident rule says the value of the game when player one plays
Vi and player two plays Yj is the value of the upturned card that is won or lost,
plus the average value of the remaining game where the average is taken over all
possible remaining upturned cards.
Blindly applying this rule results in a straightforward recursive program; how-
ever, evaluation of f(V, Y, P ) on sets of cardinality N requires N3 evaluations of f
on sets of cardinality N − 1, leading again to the (N !)3 complexity estimate.
To avoid this issue, we use a bottom-up approach storing the values f(V, Y, P )
of the subgames as we go. We use these stored values when computing the larger
subgames. Using this technique, called dynamic programming, we compute the
value of each subgame only once. For an initial N × N game, this reduces the
number of subgames we need to solve and store to
∑N
j=0 j
(
N
j
)3
, a much more feasible
number. Furthermore, we may use the symmetry between players one and two to
gain an extra factor of two, since f(V, Y, P ) = −f(Y, V, P ) and f(V, V, P ) = 0;
and at each step of the algorithm we only need to store in memory the values of
f(V, Y, P ) for a given value of j. On a large computer with 1TB core memory, the
game is then solvable up to N = 16.
Linear programs. If all values f(V, Y, P ) are known, it is then easy to compute
the optimal playing strategy. Let us say that the remaining cards are V, Y, P respec-
tively for player one, player two and the deck, and that Pk ∈ P has been turned up.
Recall the payoff matrix [Xij ] from the previous subsection. The optimal strategy,
for player one, will take the form of an list of probabilities xi of playing card Vi.
Assuming that player two plays optimally, we want to maximize minj
∑
i xiXij ;
namely, we want to maximize the outcome, allowing player two to make the best
move (= minimize the outcome) as long as she doesn’t know our move. The solution
is then a Nash equilibrium of the game.
This maximization problem is a linear program (LP), and we will solve it us-
ing linear programming tools. The classical reference [Dantzig (1963)] remains an
excellent introduction to linear programming. For example, suppose we have the
following 3× 3 matrix game:

 1 −2 3−4 5 −6
7 −8 9

 .
To formulate this as a LP, we introduce the variables x1, x2, and x3 to represent
the probabilities with which player one should play columns 1, 2, and 3 respectively.
We also introduce the variable v to represent the value of the game. The LP
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formulation of this game is as follows:
maximize v such that


x1 − 4x2 + 7x3 − v ≥ 0,
−2x1 + 5x2 − 8x3 − v ≥ 0,
3x1 − 6x2 + 9x3 − v ≥ 0,
x1 + x2 + x3 = 1,
x1 , x2 , x3 ≥ 0.
The last two constraint rows are needed to ensure that x1, x2, and x3 form a
probability distribution. The variable v is unrestricted. Note that we are maxi-
mizing the expected profit, and not the probability of winning. If we are playing
for money, and there is some agreed-upon amount per point won, then this is the
optimal strategy. If, however, we want to maximize the probability of winning, and
not the amount won, then the results may be different.
Indeed, suppose the remaining cards are queen, king, player one has 2, 4 in his
hand, and player two has ace, 3 in her hand. Player one can guarantee victory by
always playing 4 when the king shows up, but by doing so forfeits the chance of
winning both last cards, so guarantees a win by only one point. Playing either card
with same probability gives him an average gain of 12.5 (the optimal strategy is to
play high with 52% probability on the king, resulting in an average gain of 12.52).
There is a single 0 × 0 game, whose value is 0, and it may be used to start the
induction with f(∅, ∅, ∅) = 0. We note that, up to 2×2 games, the results are easily
computed by hand. Trivially, a 1× 1 game is won by the player having the largest
card. Consider the following 2× 2 matrix game:[
a b
c d
]
If a value is a minimum value in its column and a maximum value in its row,
then it is a saddle point. If the game has a saddle point, then the value of the game
is the value of a saddle point entry (there may be more than one saddle point). If
the game has no saddle point, then the value of the game is (ad−bc)/(a−b−c+d).
The formulation of a matrix game as a LP and the solution to 2× 2 matrix games
can be found in many sources (e.g. [Mendelson (2004)]).
4. Results
We have computed the winning strategies for N = 13 using the method described
in the previous section: for each triple V, Y, P of subsets of {1, . . . , 13} of same
cardinality, we have computed the value f(V, Y, P ) of the corresponding game, and
have computed the probability arrays xki with which card Vi should be played if
the upcard is Pk.
Because of its formulation as a maximization of a piecewise-linear function, these
probabilities are rational numbers. We shall argue that their denominators are so
large as to make exact computations pointless.
4.1. Implementation. We use the publicly available GLPK linear programming
solver to solve repeatedly the matrix games. This package implements the simplex
algorithm both in floating-point and multi-precision rational arithmetic.
In our computer program, we represent the card sets by bit-vectors. To conserve
space, we use a perfect hash table, that is a table whose entries correspond bijectively
to subgames. The subgames are stored in lexicographic order; each subgame is
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represented by the concatenation of the representations of player 1’s hand, player
2’s hand, and the deck. When we need the value of a previously computed subgame,
we compute its position in our ordering and grab the corresponding entry from the
table. In our dynamic programming method, we compute subgames in increasing
size of hands. To conserve space, we only store the results of the subgames of the
current size we are working on and the subgames of the next smaller size. This is
possible because the value of a subgame is needed only when computing the values
of subgames of the next larger size.
The results don’t get interesting until N = 5. There, in the initial position, the
optimal betting strategies, rounded to four digits, are
Table 1. Optimal strategy at the first move, N = 5
upcard
1 2 3 4 5
1 0.0470 0.1855 0.1182 0.1226 0.1123
2 0.8327 0 0.1188 0.07347 0.0241
3 0.1203 0.7375 0 0.1915 0
4 0 0.0770 0.7630 0.2043 0
5 0 0 0 0.4081 0.8636
The exact values, as pointed before, are prohibitively long to write down. For
example, the top entry 0.0470 is really
5306287082133275981487303358632452609704399851215456295628045583
1875882988814425504038999635791836938252991208618766205613347715
8328568084730206912059640079498714570709437787806964249018639429
44810525052774918079399954562997646185715598682274851480804900 /
1129268720669360758902051860285520214948806792442363910626460283
5249749724573405290487422550704989332508431906657764350941879381
7660750019182194563647083966290489533469158285998067618020193436
7037256681898791738381922918288920527729219085504200644992335857
We have computed the exact values up to N = 7; the numerators and denomi-
nators of the optimal probabilities have approximately one million digits.
There are only a few general patterns in this table (and in the corresponding ones
for N = 6, . . . , 12 that we do not display). If the upcard is large, say > 3N/4, then
it seems one should not bet a card< N/2 and of opposite parity. Counterintuitively,
sometimes one should bet more than double the upcard. Also, when the initial card
is N , it seems that one should never bet N − 1 nor N − 2. However, it is striking
that, in the last column, odd bets are consistently (up to i = 10) to be preferred
to even bets; and that, in general, one should bet a card of the same parity as the
upcard.
5. Outlook
The first author made a version of the program that stored the actual probability
vectors associated with the optimal strategies. These strategies were then used in a
simple program that actually played the 9-card game. Despite the counterintuitive
nature of these results, the computer player did win the majority of the games.
If you are trying to maximize the probability of winning instead of amount won,
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Table 2. Optimal strategy at the first move, N = 13
upcard
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 0 0 .052 .031 0 0 .020 0 0 0 .014 0 .010
2 .414 .227 0 .020 .056 .073 0 .034 .047 .036 0 .030 0
3 .090 .022 .178 .095 .036 .002 .069 .021 .002 0 .041 0 .037
4 .496 .299 .034 .061 .088 .098 0 .054 .065 .067 0 .056 0
5 0 .098 .230 .134 .067 0 .124 .039 0 0 .080 0 .065
6 0 .355 .092 .107 .124 .185 0 .077 .120 .098 0 .082 0
7 0 0 .274 .175 .101 .002 .168 .060 .001 0 .102 .008 .087
8 0 0 .139 .154 .165 .218 .021 .103 .142 .138 .016 .099 0
9 0 0 0 .221 .148 .045 .202 .092 .029 .015 .123 .028 .126
10 0 0 0 0 .215 .266 0 .144 .177 .170 0 .124 .013
11 0 0 0 0 0 .110 .397 .151 0 .063 .253 .065 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .226 .417 .241 .023 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .170 .348 .508 .661
then there is at least one weakness in the computed strategies. In the 9-card
game, suppose the initial upcard is a 9. The computer player will play a 9 with a
probability, rounded to four digits, of 0.7475. Now if you always play a 1, then nearly
3/4 of the time you will gain an advantage (playing a 1 against the computer’s 9 is
to your advantage due to your increased betting strength for the remainder of the
game)! The computed strategies are optimizing the amount won not the probability
of winning. When you play a 1 against the computed strategies, then in a minority
of cases the computer will play a small value winning the 9 and gaining more of
an advantage than you stand to get when the computer chooses to play a 9. The
optimal strategies for maximizing the probability of winning are still unknown.
We have not been able to determine the exact value η of an extra bidding chip,
though experimentation shows that, as R gets large, the values converge to the
estimation 1 + 1/(2N − 2), albeit very slowly.
Our computer code was run on a 64-bit computer with 160 nodes and 640GB
core memory. It relies on the GLPK linear programming library. It is available, as
a C++ program, at
http://www.uni-math.gwdg.de/laurent/gops.zip
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